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INTRODUCTION
Between 1953 and 1960, the United States’ overall military and
intelligence-gathering capacities grew enormously, driven by President
Eisenhower’s “New Look” approach to ﬁghting the Cold War. But the
distribution of powers within this New Look national-security state, the
shape of its institutional structures, and its sources of legitimacy remained up
for grabs. The eventual settlement of these issues would depend on
administrative constitutionalism—the process by which the administrative
state both shapes and is shaped by constitutional norms, often through
ostensibly non-constitutional law and policymaking.1
Constitutional concerns about civil liberties, administrative procedure,
and the separation of powers ran highest in those branches of the nationalsecurity state responsible for regulating civilian and military manpower, such
as the Loyalty-Security Program, an inter-agency eﬀort to root out
ideologically deviant federal employees, and the Selective Service System,
the civilian agency created in 1940 to register, classify, and select millions of
young men for compulsory military service. This Article focuses on the
Selective Service System, which has received far less attention from legal
scholars despite the fact that it exercised authority over a far larger (and
arguably more vulnerable) population than did the Loyalty-Security
Program.2 Administrative constitutionalism inﬂected every stage of the New
Look draft’s development: from the size and composition of draft calls; to the
arguments that draft administrators made when lobbying their congressional
patrons; to the competing interpretations of the Selective Service System’s
organic statute and regulations oﬀered by Justice Department and Selective
Service lawyers; to judicial review of these interpretations; to how executive

1 See Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2013) (“In
practice, administrative constitutionalism . . . encompasses the elaboration of new constitutional
understandings by administrative actors, as well as the construction (or “constitution”) of the
administrative state through structural and substantive measures.”).
2 Important recent works on the Loyalty-Security Program include SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE
RED SCARE, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1941–1960 (2004);
ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA REPRESSION: ONE
HUNDRED DECISIONS (2012); LANDON R. Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE
UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT (2012); and Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor:
Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property”, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379 (2008).
For the legal history of the Selective Service System in this period, see JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG
& ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE, 1940–1954 (2016); JEREMY K. KESSLER, FORTRESS OF LIBERTY: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE DRAFT AND REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming); and Megan Threlkeld, “The
War Power is Not a Blank Check”: The Supreme Court and Conscientious Objection, 1917-1973, 31 J. POL’Y
HIST. 303 (2019).
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branch lawyers responded to—and sometimes tried to preempt—judicial
criticism by modifying the substance and procedure of draft decisionmaking.
By reconstructing the anxious, constitutional dialogue that shaped the
administration of military manpower under President Eisenhower’s New
Look, this Article explores the role that administrative constitutionalism
played in the development of the American national-security state, a state
that became both more powerful and more legalistic during the pivotal years
of the Cold War.3 The Article also questions the frequent identiﬁcation of
administrative constitutionalism with the relative autonomy and opacity of
the federal bureaucracy. The back-and-forth of administrative
constitutionalism continually recalibrated the degree of autonomy and
opacity that characterized the draft apparatus. This evidence suggests that
bureaucratic autonomy and opacity may be more usefully understood as
products, rather than preconditions, of administrative constitutionalism.
The remainder of the Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces
readers to President Eisenhower’s New Look grand strategy, and its
relationship to the President’s legal, political, and economic commitments on
the homefront. Part II looks more closely at the legal and political culture of
administrative law reform that blossomed during President Eisenhower’s ﬁrst
term, and assesses the threat this culture posed to the Selective Service
System. While countervailing Cold War imperatives helped the System avoid
new legislative restrictions on its classiﬁcation and induction authority, the
judiciary proved more aggressive.
Part III reconstructs the steady rise of judicial scrutiny of Selective
Service decisionmaking over the course of the 1950s. During this period, the
federal courts came to identify the administration of civilian and military
manpower as a unique threat to civil liberty. Whereas administrative law
reformers mounted a wholesale critique of agency governance, the civil
libertarian critique of Cold War manpower administration enabled lawyers
and judges to target the autonomy and authority of the Selective Service
System with more precision. This civil libertarian critique did not only
confront draft administrators in the courts. To the contrary, the critique’s
steady judicial success depended in part on the unwillingness of Justice
Department lawyers to counter it. At the heart of Part III, and the Article as
a whole, lurks this intra-administrative conﬂict between Selective Service and
Justice Department oﬃcials as to the practical importance and constitutional
integrity of draft administration.

3 For this periodization of the Cold War, see generally Anders Stephanson, Cold War Degree
Zero, in UNCERTAIN EMPIRE: AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE IDEA OF THE COLD WAR 19-49
(Joel Isaac & Duncan Bell eds., 2012).
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Part IV traces the Selective Service System’s response to these mid-1950s
defeats. Having lost the support of both legal professionals and military
planners, draft administrators cultivated a new client base by transforming
their regulatory agenda. Earlier in the decade, the System had resisted capture
by the deferment lobby, the coalition of industrialists, educators, and middleclass families who wanted as much high-quality manpower as possible deferred
into the private sector. While the deferment lobby’s demands were at odds
with the egalitarian vision of veteran draft administrators, the New Look’s
libertarian legal culture and austere grand strategy had effectively foreclosed
that vision. By becoming an agency specializing in deferment, rather than
induction, the Selective Service System traded the contentious confines of the
courtroom for the sprawling office park and the university quad. This trade
gave draft administrators a badly needed infusion of social legitimation and
political support. But it also tied the fate of the Selective Service System to
the New Look paradigm: should political and military leaders abandon the
New Look, and seek to wage another limited war with a conscript army, draft
administrators would have to contend not only with the skepticism of the
courts and the Justice Department, but also with the anger of a deferment
lobby that had come to rely on the Selective Service System’s largesse.
I. A NEW LOOK FOR THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential victory put a Republican in the
Oval Oﬃce for the ﬁrst time in twenty years. Although the Party had chosen
Eisenhower for his reputation as a politically moderate war hero, the former
Supreme Allied Commander and early Cold War grand strategist ran on a
passionately anti-communist, anti-bureaucratic, and civil-libertarian agenda.
Given this rhetoric, Republican hopes were high that a full rollback of New
Deal and Fair Deal governance might ﬁnally be at hand.
According to the 1952 Republican platform, the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations had “violated our liberties by turning loose upon the country
a swarm of arrogant bureaucrats and their agents who meddle intolerably in
the lives and occupations of our citizens.”4 For too long, Democratic
administrators had “arrogantly deprived our citizens of precious liberties by
seizing powers never granted” and “worked unceasingly to achieve their goal
of national socialism.”5 During the campaign, Eisenhower declared “his
intention to rid Government of the incompetent, dishonest, [and] disloyal.”6
Although electoral politics encouraged this kind of rhetoric, Eisenhower was
4 Text of the Republican Party’s 1952 Campaign Platform Adopted by National Convention, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1952, at 8.
5 Id.
6 JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE 197 (2012).
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“skeptical of government-by-administration” and openly “question[ed] the
constitutionality of the administrative state.”7 As he warned his close friend,
the textile magnate George Sloan, the “drift toward statism” that had
characterized the Truman years “must be halted in its tracks.”8 The
“individual liberties” of the American people and their “entire system of free
government” depended on an administrative counterrevolution.9
Putting his words into action, the new President pursued three policies
to shrink the federal bureaucracy and to render it more hospitable to the
free market. First, “Eisenhower sought to replace what he called an
‘exclusive dependence on Federal bureaucracy’ with ‘a partnership of state
and local communities, private citizens, and the Federal Government, all
working together.’”10
Second, Eisenhower sought to reform the inner workings of the federal
government by changing the sorts of bureaucrats who ran it. This meant
opening the doors of the White House to big business, while closing them to
alleged subversives. The President “tightened loyalty standards for federal
hiring and retention” and ﬁred suspect employees throughout the Internal
Revenue Service and the Justice Department.11 He then used his appointment
power to place businessmen and other admirers of corporate governance
throughout his cabinet and at the top of federal agencies and commissions.12
Finally, and most signiﬁcantly, Eisenhower reined in New Deal and Fair
Deal governance by slashing agency budgets. Given the “substantial and
immediate budgetary gap for the coming ﬁscal year,” Eisenhower needed
little political cover to do so.13 Defense spending had spiked during the
Korean War—from thirteen billion dollars in 1950 to forty billion in 1952—
and the annual national-security budget was scheduled to break the sixty
billion mark in 1955.14 Veterans’ beneﬁts, debt service, and the costs of
running the rest of the administrative state would add another twenty-billion
dollars to the annual bill.15 Although President Truman had pushed through
tax increases to cover some of these costs, a reluctant Congress had attached
short sunset provisions to the most aggressive—and progressive—revenueboosting measures.16 The excess-proﬁts tax, targeting those industries that
reaped the greatest beneﬁts from Cold War spending, was set to expire in
7 Id. at 199.
8 Robert Griﬃth, Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 87, 92 (1982).
9 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 199 (quoting Eisenhower).
10 Griﬃth, supra note 8, at 106.
11 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 197.
12 Griﬃth, supra note 8, at 105-107.
13 AARON L. FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE 126 (2002).
14 Id. at 125.
15 Id. at 126.
16 Id.
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June 1953.17 By the spring of 1954, both individual and corporate income-tax
rates would “revert to their pre-emergency levels.”18 An eighteen-billiondollar shortfall loomed.19
Eisenhower saw this “ticking ﬁscal time bomb” as a great opportunity.20
Not only did it provide an ideologically muted argument for scaling back the
regulatory ambitions of agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board
and the Federal Security Administration, but ﬁscal retrenchment also
harmonized with Eisenhower’s ambitious plans to transform American
military strategy. Having witnessed the spread of total war as Supreme Allied
Commander during World War II, Eisenhower doubted the viability of
limited yet manpower-intensive ground wars, such as the one that he
inherited in Korea. He believed that any local conﬂict with Soviet-backed
forces would eventually spiral into a total confrontation decided by nuclear
superiority. Rather than training, outﬁtting, and risking men to serve as
prelude to this decisive, devastating contest, Eisenhower preferred to focus
military spending on what his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called
“massive retaliatory power.”21 An unparalleled nuclear arsenal would make it
“possible to get and to share more basic security at less cost.”22 In October
1953, the National Security Council codified Eisenhower and Dulles’s “New
Look” approach.23
The national security agency most directly threatened by New Look’s
strategic focus on nuclear weapons, covert operations, and cheap security was
the Selective Service System. Since the System’s creation in 1940, Selective
Service administrators had registered, classiﬁed, and drafted millions of
young American men for compulsory military service.24 This work made the
draft apparatus a crucial but highly controversial bridge between the welfare
and warfare states built by Eisenhower’s Democratic predecessors, exposing
draft administrators to a host of critics, from paciﬁsts and civil libertarians to
corporate lawyers, business lobbyists, and conservative politicians opposed to

Id.
Id.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 126.
See CAMPBELL CRAIG, DESTROYING THE VILLAGE: EISENHOWER AND THERMONUCLEAR
WAR 48 (1998) (quoting Dulles). For further discussion of Eisenhower’s strategic vision, see generally
CAMPBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA’S COLD WAR 139-215 (2013).
22 See GERARD DEGROOT, THE BOMB: A LIFE 189 (2004) (quoting Eisenhower).
23 See generally Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy, A Report to the National
Security Council, NSC 162/2 (Oct. 30, 1953).
24 See generally GEORGE FLYNN, THE DRAFT (1993).
17
18
19
20
21
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federal supervision of labor relations, education, and the health and safety of
vulnerable populations.25
The New Look “put the draft in limbo.”26 Draft calls dropped from
472,000 men in 1953 to 253,000 in 1954 to 153,000 in 1955, and continued to
fall thereafter.27 For draft administrators, this collapse in strategic support for
conscription could not have come at a worse time, as the Selective Service
System was still reeling from the many defeats it had suﬀered in the federal
courts during and after the Korean War. By 1954, Selective Service
administrators had come to believe that only a series of bold amendments to
their organic statute might push back against the judiciary’s debilitating
supervision of the registration and classiﬁcation process.28 Yet if the
Commander-in-Chief no longer saw conscription as an essential weapon in
the anti-communist arsenal, would he really stick his neck out to scold federal
judges for being too protective of the civil liberties of draft registrants?
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM AND THE SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM
Making matters worse, many legislators felt that President Eisenhower
was not doing nearly enough to tame the administrative state, despite his
budget cuts, pro-business appointments, and heightened loyalty standards.
Inﬂuential ﬁgures in the legal and business world agreed. In particular, the
American Bar Association and its corporate clients warned that neither the
Administrative Procedure Act nor its implementation by the federal courts
had provided a suﬃcient corrective to the executive branch’s domination of
American social and economic life.29 In July 1953, congressional and private
sector critics converged on a provisional solution: the resurrection of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government,
colloquially known as the Second Hoover Commission.
The First Hoover Commission—named for its chairman, former
Republican President Herbert Hoover—operated from 1947 to 1949. As one
of the Commission’s Democratic members recalled, Hoover’s goal was to use
procedural reform of the executive branch “as a vehicle to overturn the New

25 See generally J. GARRY CLIFFORD & SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR., THE FIRST PEACETIME
DRAFT (1986); see also FLYNN, supra note 24, at 88-133 (reviewing the major sources of Truman-era
criticism).
26 FLYNN, supra note 24, at 138; FRIEDBERG, supra note 13, at 179-80.
27 FLYNN, supra note 24, at 139.
28 See Letter from Col. Omer to Gen. Renfrow, 1-2 (Jan. 31, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central
Files 1948–1963, Box 35 (submitting a series of “desirable amendments” for consideration).
29 See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 128 HARV. L. REV. 718, 762772 (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE (2014)).
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Deal in substance.”30 Hoover himself denounced the “welfare state” as “a
disguise for the totalitarian state.”31 The re-election of President Truman in
1948, however, stymied his plans.32 Four years later, with a Republican in the
White House, Hoover and his allies felt that the time was ripe to ﬁnish the
work they had begun in 1947. At the Second Commission’s inaugural meeting,
Hoover declared, “This time we will not be deﬂected from our purpose.”33
The most radical arm of the Commission was its Task Force on Legal
Services and Procedure. Most of the Task Force’s members knew each other
from the American Bar Association, where they had spent decades discussing
how to impose more court-like procedures and greater judicial review on New
Deal and Fair Deal administrators.34 The Task Force’s final report attested to
this legal and political vision: “The more closely that administrative
procedures can be made to conform to judicial procedures, the greater the
probability that justice will be attained in the administrative process.”35 Such
statements, however, risked falling afoul of one of the Second Hoover
Commission’s purported goals—the improvement of administrative efficiency.
The anti-bureaucratic ideology of the mid-1950s was shot through with
this contradiction: on the one hand, critics targeted the administrative state’s
sloth and wastefulness; on the other hand, they assailed its lawless, summary
decisionmaking.36 The Task Force insisted that these two countervailing
critiques were, in fact, compatible: “Formalization of administrative
procedures along judicial lines is consistent with eﬃciency and simpliﬁcation
of the administrative process.”37 If implemented in full, however, the Task
Force’s “recommendations would have signiﬁcantly enlarged administrative
staﬀs . . . slowed down administrative decision making, and vastly increased
the work of the federal courts.”38 At nearly every point, the value of eﬃciency
was trumped by the charge that “individual rights were being lost in the
administrative process.”39
While this emphasis on “formalization” and individual rights conﬂicted
with the Commission’s charge to balance fairness and eﬃciency, it
harmonized with popular doubts about the legitimacy of administrative
GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting Rowe).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 161-78.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 213.
COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV., TASK FORCE REPORT ON
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 138 (1955) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
36 See Reuel Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing
Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1414-16 (2000).
37 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 138.
38 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 215.
39 Id.
30
31
32
33
34
35
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government. As Louis Jaﬀe, a prominent critic of many of the Task Force’s
proposals, acknowledged: “It is now generally conceded that judicial control
is a necessary condition of administrative law in this country. The public,”
Jaﬀe continued, “demands that there be an independent organ of government
to guarantee that the agencies stay within the limits set by statute. This
guarantee is important not only to the individual citizen but to the agency if
it is to win public acceptance.”40 The Task Force’s main recommendations
took the form of a proposed piece of legislation, the Administrative Code,
that began circulating in January 1955.
When Selective Service headquarters received a copy on February 1, the
Code sparked a panic. Passage of the Code would doom the legislative
reforms that draft administrators believed were necessary to repair the
damage that a decade of judicial interference had done to the post-WWII
Selective Service System. Indeed, the Code aﬃrmatively endorsed even
greater judicial control of the draft.
The current draft law—the Universal Military Training and Service of
1951— contained language exempting the Selective Service System from most
procedural rules and judicial supervision imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act. The APA itself had established this precedent, exempting the
1940 draft law from all its requirements except for the publication of
administrative regulations. The newly proposed Administrative Code, by
contrast, abolished all such exemptions.41 According to the Task Force, the
purpose of these exemptions had been “to cover emergency functions which
were of a temporary nature . . . following World War II.”42 It no longer made
sense, however, to think of “emergency” functions such as conscription as
“temporary.” Exposing the existential dilemma of a peacetime, Cold War
draft, the Task Force concluded that “[c]ontinued exemption of [these]
functions . . . is now clearly anomalous.”43
On February 23, General Hershey wrote the Second Hoover
Commission’s executive director to detail the threat that the Code posed to
conscription. If “the proposed Code [were] enacted into law,” Hershey
insisted, “it would be essential” to amend the current draft law “to provide
that [its] functions . . . shall be excluded . . . .”44 Otherwise, the entire
registration, classiﬁcation, and induction process “would be subject to all
requirements of the Code,” including “formal hearings on all issues,
representation by attorneys, and preliminary and ﬁnal review by the courts
40
41
42
43
44

Louis Jaﬀe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1291 (1955).
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 389-90.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Letter from Lewis B. Hershey to John B. Hollister, 1 (Feb. 23, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Box 36.
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of all agency actions.”45 Such judicial and quasi-judicial impositions would
have a devastating impact on the work of “[s]ome 3950 local boards . . . the
members of which serve without compensation, and for the most part are
laymen not skilled in legal procedures.”46 These boards were responsible for
upwards of two million “classiﬁcation actions” every year.47 The Code would
also impede the “[a]dditional thousands of classiﬁcation actions . . .
completed annually by the 94 appeal boards and by the National Selective
Service Appeal Board which acts for the President.”48 In short, Hershey
concluded the Code “could not be complied with in the Selective Service
operation if any men were ever to be promptly available for delivery to the
armed forces for induction.”49
Thankfully for the Selective Service System, the Task Force’s
“revolutionary” project stalled in Congress.50 While the full Commission
agreed with much of the Task Force’s proposed Code, there was internal
disagreement about the most aggressive, anti-bureaucratic measures, such as
making judicial review available at every stage of administrative
decisionmaking.51 Some commissioners objected to such provisions as overly
“legalistic,” while others approved of them in theory but worried that they
would mark the Commission as a body of lawyers unconcerned with the cost
and eﬃciency of government.52 So a majority of commissioners declined to
embrace the Code in its entirety.53 Instead, the Commission forwarded the
Code to Congress for its independent consideration while formally endorsing
a smaller set of reforms.54
While more modest than the Code’s call for total judicialization of the
administrative state, the Commission’s proposals still would, in the words of
President Eisenhower’s Budget Bureau, “turn[] the clock back with a
vengeance!”55 Such an ambitious renovation of the national bureaucracy was
too big a gamble during a period of great geopolitical uncertainty. Anticommunist ideology drove the critique of the administrative state, but it also
limited the risks political leaders were willing to take when it came to
degrading state capacity in the midst of a standoﬀ with the Soviet Union.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 227 (“Consistent opposition from the agencies and a lack of
strong pressure in Congress left the bills adrift.”).
51 Id. at 218.
52 Id. at 220.
53 Id. at 219.
54 Id. at 220.
55 Id. at 224.
45
46
47
48
49
50
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Hobbled by internal doubts and disagreements, the Commission saw its own
recommendations, as well as the Task Force’s Administrative Code, shelved
by Eisenhower and allied legislators.
The spirit of administrative law reform did not, however, require political
consensus to thrive. In the seven-year interim between the death of Franklin
Roosevelt and the election of Dwight Eisenhower, the federal judiciary had
expanded its supervision of the administrative state, implementing in a
piecemeal manner many of the doctrinal reforms that the Hoover
Commission sought to codify.
Take one of the Commission’s more controversial recommendations: the
replacement of the APA’s substantial-evidence standard for reviewing
administrative fact-ﬁnding with a more exacting, clearly erroneous
standard.56 The defeat of this recommendation at the political level only
masked the fact that federal judges had already been moving toward a higher
standard for some time. As administrative law scholar Bernard Schwartz
noted at the time: “Whether or not the [Commission’s] recommendation is
adopted, that will not alter the fact that the scope of review in federal
administrative law has very deﬁnitely been tending to approach that which
prevails” when appellate courts review the fact-ﬁnding of district courts—
that is, “clearly erroneous” review.57 In other words, at least some courts were
already acting like the Commission’s recommendations were the law of the
land. These courts tended to treat administrative agencies more like inferior
judicial bodies than autonomous executive decisionmakers, precisely the
approach that Hoover preferred.
Nor were courts necessarily bashful about this changed relationship with
administrative agencies. As early as 1952, Schwartz noted, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals had declared that “it is diﬃcult to draw the line between
the function of an appellate court in passing upon the decision of a trial judge
sitting without a jury . . . on the one hand, and the function of the court in
reviewing the decision of an administrative tribunal on the other . . . . The
mental processes of the reviewing authority which are called into action in
each situation are so similar that they can hardly be distinguished.”58
Most striking of all was the fact that even when courts reviewed
administrative decisions exempt from the APA—including those of the
Selective Service System—they were increasingly likely to imitate the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, if not its rhetoric. “[I]t is generally agreed today by
students of administrative law that the operation of the APA should be
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 416.
Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1390, 1393 (1955).
58 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1952)).
56
57
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uniform throughout the federal administrative process,” Schwartz
explained.59 “Few outside the immediate agencies concerned do not deplore
the exception of individual agencies from the procedure law.”60
On March 14, 1955, the Supreme Court decided four draft-law cases that
confirmed Schwartz’s analysis. The draft had dodged a bullet when the Second
Hoover Commission’s vision of administrative reform proved too risky for the
President and many in Congress to support. But the March 14 Supreme Court
decisions hit the Selective Service System squarely in the chest. Assessing the
damage, draft administrators became more certain than ever before that only
a strong political response to the courts would save conscription.
III. THE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF MILITARY
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
In the wake of the Selective Service System’s widely praised performance
during World War II, most American voters and political leaders agreed that
an unprecedented regime of “peacetime” conscription was an imperative of
the global struggle against communism. Patriotic acceptance of the Cold War
draft did not, however, insulate the Selective Service System from the
growing suspicion of “New Deal bureaucracy” among legal elites. As this
anti-bureaucratic mood spread through the federal courts in the mid-1940s
and early 1950s, formerly deferential judges began to embrace the task of
assessing the validity of Selective Service decisionmaking. Not only had
Congress oﬀered no resistance to this development, it had even ﬂirted with
legislation exposing the draft to more judicial control. Meanwhile, the Justice
Department became increasingly reluctant to bring draft prosecutions and
increasingly skeptical of the Selective Service System’s own practices.
Between 1950 and 1953, the United States’ shooting war against
communism on the Korean Peninsula only accelerated these trends. In 1952,
the Supreme Court rebuﬀed the Truman administration’s eﬀorts to extend
the practices of emergency governance pioneered during the New Deal and
World War II to the more limited context of mobilization for a “limited”
military campaign in a single operational theater.61 Then, in 1953, the high
Court responded to a rush of prosecutions of Korean War draft resisters by
imposing a higher degree of scrutiny on Selective Service fact-ﬁnding.62 No
longer would federal judges be expected to defer to administrative decisions
on a draft registrant’s entitlement to statutory exemptions from military service.
Id. at 1391.
Id.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For the political and military
context of the decision, see generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1977).
62 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
59
60
61
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Given these unfavorable trends, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear
argument in four major draft-law cases in the Fall of 1954 alarmed Selective
Service leaders. All but certain of an unfavorable outcome, they spent the
holidays preparing a disciplined administrative response to whatever new,
damaging doctrines the Court might announce. In mid-January, General
Counsel Daniel Omer began to schedule conferences with state Selective
Service directors for “immediately after the Supreme Court renders its
decisions.”63 At that time, draft administrators would “discuss the eﬀect” of
the decisions, and “promote a uniform enforcement policy . . . with respect
to the [legal] issues” that the Supreme Court resolved.64 Omer believed a
uniform enforcement policy to be critical for at least two reasons: ﬁrst,
because uniform enforcement was a hallmark of the rule-of-law values that
many draft critics felt the Selective Service System violated; second, because
uniform enforcement would make it easier for the General Counsel’s Oﬃce
to manage its case load, controlling when and under what circumstances
lower-court judges would get a chance to elaborate—and potentially extend—
the Supreme Court’s rulings.
On March 14, the Supreme Court conﬁrmed the fears of Omer and his
colleagues. Three of the four draft-law decisions handed down that day
reversed the convictions of draft registrants who had been denied
conscientious-objector status.65 Each reversal placed new limits on draft
administrators’ freedom of action, while legitimating novel legal objections
to the draft. The fourth decision, Witmer v. United States, at ﬁrst seemed to
cut the other way, aﬃrming the conviction of a Witness who had been denied
conscientious-objector status.66 But upon closer inspection, the Witmer
majority opinion delivered more bad news: it signaled a new standard—even
more exacting than the one that Dickinson v. United States had established two
years earlier—for determining when classiﬁcation decisions had an adequate
“basis in fact.”67
A. Witmer v. United States: Heightened Scrutiny of Selective Service Fact-finding
The author of the majority opinion in Dickinson, former Attorney General
Tom Clark, was also responsible for all four March 14 decisions, including

63 Letter from Col. Daniel O. Omer to Warren Olney III, Assist. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 23, 1955),
NARA, RG 147, Central Files 1948-1963, Box 96.
64 Id.
65 Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 386 (1955); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
383 (1955); Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 406 (1955); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S.
407, 417 (1955).
66 Witmer, 348 U.S. at 383.
67 Id. at 381-83.
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Witmer. In Dickinson, Justice Clark had expanded the federal courts’ authority
to review the fact-ﬁnding of Selective Service administrators: whenever a
draft resister made a prima facie case that he was entitled to a certain
classiﬁcation, judges should ask whether there was “aﬃrmative evidence” in
the administrative record supporting an alternative classiﬁcation.68 If the
answer was “no,” the resister could not be convicted for refusing to serve.69
At the time, legal commentators had noted that Dickinson’s “aﬃrmative
evidence” rule worked much like the “substantial evidence” standard that
courts used when reviewing the factual basis of administrative decisions
covered by the Administrative Procedure Act.70 The draft apparatus, however,
was not supposed to be subject to such a searching standard of review.
Although Justice Clark’s majority opinion insisted that the Court was not
altering this deferential status quo but simply elaborating the basis-in-fact
standard it had invented seven years earlier in Estep,71 the claim was
unconvincing. Draft administrators, Justice Department lawyers, and legal
scholars all viewed the Dickinson Court’s expansion of judicial review as
potentially disastrous for future enforcement of the draft law.
Still, there had remained hope that the aﬃrmative evidence rule could be
cabined to the particular circumstances of the Dickinson case, which involved
a registrant who claimed to be a minister, and thus entitled to a statutory
exemption. Might denials of conscientious-objector—rather than
ministerial—classiﬁcations be subject to less searching review? In Witmer, the
Supreme Court ﬁnally answered that question with a resounding “no,” even
as it aﬃrmed the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed to be a
conscientious objector.72 The problem for Philip Andrew Witmer was that
there did exist “aﬃrmative evidence” suﬃcient to support an “inference of
[his] insincerity or bad faith.”73 The record in Witmer’s case showed that he
had made several inconsistent statements, at times even suggesting he would
be happy to support the war eﬀort.74 This evidence, Justice Clark concluded,
“cast considerable doubt” on Witmer’s sincerity.75 So it had been reasonable
for draft administrators to deny his claim to a conscientious-objector

Dickinson, 346 U.S. at 396.
Id. at 397.
See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 451 n. 71
(citing Dickinson as evidence that the Supreme Court was converging on substantial-evidence-like
review even in contexts where administrative decision-making was presumptively unreviewable).
71 See Dickinson, 346 U.S. at 399.
72 Witmer, 348 U.S. at 384.
73 Id. at 382.
74 Id. at 382-83.
75 Id. at 383.
68
69
70
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deferment.76 Yet how Justice Clark arrived at this conclusion was far from
deferential to draft decisionmakers.
Justice Clark’s majority opinion amounted to nothing less than a searching
review of all the evidence presented during Witmer’s classiﬁcation
proceedings. This review sought to determine whether the “objective facts”
that “cast doubt on the sincerity” of Witmer’s conscientious-objector claim
outweighed the evidence supporting his sincerity.77 As the administrative law
scholar Louis Jaﬀe remarked with surprise, not only was this approach
unprecedented in the draft-law context, but it was also “almost identical” to
the ever-more-demanding “substantial evidence” standard used by courts in
evaluating the fact-ﬁnding of agencies covered by the Administrative
Procedure Act.78 While the Universal Military Training and Service Act
explicitly exempted the draft apparatus from the APA-imposed “substantial
evidence” standard, such legislative exemptions no longer seemed eﬀective:
“Whatever the statutory formula, a court is strongly moved to administer the
law according to its idea of the proper function of judicial review.”79
The Witmer Court did reassert that, when reviewing draft-classiﬁcation
decisions, courts should not “look for substantial evidence,” but only check
for some “basis in fact” supporting the decision.80 As though elaborating this
narrower standard, Justice Clark explained that where “there was conﬂicting
evidence or where two inferences could be drawn from the same testimony,”
judges should defer to the Selective Service System.81 Yet, as Jaﬀe noted,
“almost identical language was used in Universal Camera,” the case that had
put meat on the bones of the “substantial evidence” test.82 “Unless I have
misconceived the substantial evidence test,” Jaﬀe remarked, “I fail to see how,
at least in this case, its application would have diﬀered even in phrasing” from
the approach taken by the Witmer Court.83 In other words, the Supreme
Court was now treating the factual ﬁndings of draft administrators with at
least as much skepticism as it treated the ﬁndings of administrators
responsible for purely domestic activities unrelated to military manpower or
national security.84
76 Id. at 381-83. See also Note, The Scope of Review, Due Process, and the Conscientious Objector —
Some Unresolved Problems, 50 NW. U. L. REV. 660, 667 n.45 (1955) (noting that “mere disbelief or
doubt by the board of the registrant’s credibility do[es] not constitute a basis in fact unless
substantiated by evidence of insincerity or bad faith on the record”).
77 Witmer, 348 U.S. at 382.
78 Louis Jaﬀe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1048-50 (1956).
79 Id. at 1050.
80 Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381.
81 Id. at 383.
82 Jaﬀe, supra note 78, at 1048.
83 Id. at 1048-49.
84 Id.
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Jaﬀe’s reading of Witmer proved prophetic. By 1958, the Chief of the
Conscientious Objector Section of the Justice Department reported that
“notwithstanding” the Witmer Court’s gestures of deference, “courts continue
to favor the registrant prosecuted for refusing induction after his
conscientious objector claim is denied . . . . [W]here there is any doubt
concerning the registrant’s sincerity or his entitlement to a procedural right,
such doubts are generally resolved in the registrant’s favor.”85 A year later,
Duke University law professor Robert Kramer announced that “we are
witnessing a period of intensive criticism and reappraisal of the entire
administrative process.”86 The realm of national-security administration was
no exception. As an example of how willing civilian courts had become to
police “military matters,” Kramer cited Witmer: while judicial review of draft
classiﬁcations “was initially limited to determining only whether there was
any ‘basis in fact’ for the classiﬁcation,” “later decisions” such as Witmer had
“approximated review . . . to the substantial evidence test customarily used”
outside the draft context.87
Selective Service administrators got the message immediately. Ten days
after Witmer came down, the Selective Service General Counsel circulated a
memorandum politely titled “Judicial Decisions Suggesting Legislative
Correction.”88 It began with a list of recent appellate cases in which courts
had reversed the convictions of draft resisters because the evidence weighing
against their claims of conscientious objection was deemed insuﬃcient to
reasonably support an inference of insincerity. Witmer had aﬃrmed that this
was the right approach for courts to take. The General Counsel’s list mapped
a mineﬁeld of evidence on which draft boards could no longer rely in
discerning the insincerity of alleged paciﬁsts. “Insuﬃcient” evidence, for
example, now included facts such as willingness to work in a naval shipyard
and former membership in the National Guard.89
The other three draft-law cases decided by the Supreme Court on March
14, 1955, were as damaging as Witmer’s heightened scrutiny of Selective
Service fact-ﬁnding, if not more so. In each case, the Court reversed a draft
resister’s conviction because of some procedural error on the part of the
Selective Service System. Months before these reversals, the ACLU litigator
J.B. Tietz had noted that most draft resisters’ victories in the courts were won
85 T. Oscar Smith & Derrick A. Bell, The Conscientious-Objector Program: A Search for Sincerity,
19 PITT. L. REV. 697, 706 (1958).
86 Robert Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 29
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
87 Id. at 19.
88 Letter from Wertz & Wixcey to Col. Frank (Mar. 23, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central Files
1948-1963, Box 96.
89 Id.
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through procedural rather than evidentiary challenges to Selective Service
decisionmaking, and that the “increase in number of cases recognizing such”
procedural challenges was “startling.”90 On March 14, the Supreme Court gave
its blessing to this “startling” development.
B. Simmons v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of
Justice Department Procedures
In Simmons v. United States, six Justices joined Justice Clark in conﬁrming
and extending the Court’s 1953 decision in United States v. Nugent.91 In that
case, the Court had required that the Justice Department give conscientiousobjector claimants a “fair resume” of the reports that the FBI compiled on
them.92 The Nugent Court based this conclusion on a strong interpretation of
the 1951 draft law’s “hearing” provision: “The Department of Justice, after
appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and
good faith [of each conscientious objector claimaint].”93 By “hearing,” the
Nugent Court argued, Congress had surely meant a fair hearing—one in which
the registrant could confront and rebut any evidence undermining his
“character and good faith.”94 Such a fair hearing would only be possible if the
registrant was given a “fair resume” of his FBI report. The Nugent Court,
however, did not make clear what kind of “fair resume” was necessary to
render the hearing “fair.” So between 1953 and 1955, federal judges were left
to their own devices. They often demanded to see the entire FBI report to
determine whether a registrant had, in fact, received a “fair resume” of its
contents. Because these reports were considered top secret, Justice Department
lawyers usually refused to turn them over, preferring to drop a shaky
prosecution rather than sacrifice the autonomy of their FBI investigators.
Two years after Nugent, the Simmons Court added meat to the bones of
the fair-resume requirement. Invalidating the conviction of a Jehovah’s
Witness who had received only an oral description of the contents of his FBI
report, Justice Clark held: “A fair resume is one which will permit the
registrant to defend against the adverse evidence—to explain it, rebut it, or
otherwise detract from its damaging force.”95 At Simmons’s hearing, by
contrast, “[t]he [oral] remarks of the hearing oﬃcer at most amounted to
vague hints [about the contents of the FBI report], and these apparently

90
91
92
93
94
95

J.B. Tietz, Jehovah’s Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 133 (1955).
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-10.
Simmons, 348 U.S. at 405.
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failed to alert [the registrant] to the dangers ahead.”96 So the hearing lacked
“basic fairness.”97
As in Nugent, the Supreme Court insisted that no constitutional issues
were at stake—only Congress’s (imputed) intent to provide a “fair” Justice
Department hearing. Yet both Simmons and Nugent exempliﬁed the tendency
of the Cold War Court to read statutes as requiring heightened procedural
protections for administered parties. Without actual statutory language
articulating these protections, their most obvious source was the Fifth
Amendment’s right to procedural due process.
Yet it was far from clear that even the Fifth Amendment would require a
registrant to have an opportunity to confront all adverse evidence at his
Justice Department hearing. The outcome of this hearing was merely
advisory, as it was the Selective Service appeal board—not the Justice
Department—that made the ﬁnal decision about a registrant’s request for
conscientious-objector classiﬁcation. And unless the appeal board’s denial of
this request was unanimous, the registrant could appeal the denial to the
Presidential Appeal Board.98 Finally, even after a ﬁnal classiﬁcation decision
was reached, the registrant had the right to ask his local draft board to reopen his case to consider new evidence.99
Given these many administrative checks on the validity of the ﬁnal
classiﬁcation, as well as the advisory nature of the Justice Department’s
recommendation, government lawyers argued that the vague summary of
Simmons’s FBI report was at worst a “harmless error,” not a constitutional
violation. They bolstered this argument with a citation to Market Street Railway,
a unanimous 1945 decision in which Justice Robert Jackson wrote that the
constitutional norm of procedural due process “is not to be trivialized by formal
objections that have no substantial bearing on the ultimate rights of parties.”100
In response to the government’s invocation of Market Street Railway,
Justice Clark ﬁrst sought to sidestep the issue, insisting again that the
question was not what procedures the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
might impose, but the intentions of Congress—as interpreted by the Court—
in requiring a Justice Department “hearing.”101 This argument, however, was
undermined by Justice Clark’s second response to the government: Market
Street Railway and Simmons, he reasoned, were distinguished by the fact that
96 Id. at 397.
97 Id. at 405.
98 Id. at 399-403.
99 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1606.32(a)(1), 1606.38(c), 1625.1(a), 1625.2 (2018).
100 Market St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of California, 324 U.S. 548, 562 (1945).
101 Simmons, 348 U.S. at 405. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative

State, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1055-1057 (1984) (describing the Cold War Court’s use of aggressive statutory
interpretation in lieu of procedural due process analysis in the loyalty-security context).
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the ﬁrst involved the regulation of public-utility companies, while the second
involved the conscription of individual citizens, potentially in violation of
their deeply held beliefs.102 This distinction itself, however, implied a
constitutional argument: because draft administration threatened rights to
bodily security and freedom of belief, rights that were of more constitutional
signiﬁcance than those at play in the economic regulation of utility
companies, more process was due.
Whatever the soundness—or basis—of the Simmons Court’s reasoning,
Justice Department hearing oﬃcers would now have to detail all adverse
evidence in a registrant’s FBI report. And they would have to do so even if
the Selective Service System did not base its ﬁnal classiﬁcation decision on
that evidence. Otherwise, the procedural error would result in invalidation of
the classiﬁcation and the government’s inability to draft the registrant or to
prosecute him for draft evasion.
C. Gonzales v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of
Selective Service Procedures
The third case decided on March 14, Gonzales v. United States,103 furnished
draft resisters with yet another procedural right. A month after registering
for the draft, Jose Valdez Gonzales had become a Jehovah’s Witness
“minister.”104 Realizing the weakness of his ministerial claim, however,
Gonzales requested a conscientious-objector classiﬁcation instead. Selective
Service denied this request, and the Justice Department then prosecuted
Gonzales when he refused to submit to induction.105 Lacking any better
arguments, Gonzales’s lawyer Hayden Covington introduced a novel defense:
because Gonzales had not been given a copy of the Justice Department’s
advisory opinion on his conscientious-objector claim or an opportunity to ﬁle
a reply to it, the Selective Service System’s eventual denial of his claim was
invalid.106 This was so, Covington contended, even though Gonzales had
never requested the advisory opinion or a chance to rebut it.
Justice Clark and ﬁve other Justices agreed with Covington. Although the
Universal Military Training and Service Act required no such procedures,
these Justices found them to be “implicit” in the draft law’s “hearing”
provision, once that provision was “viewed against our underlying concepts
of procedural regularity and basic fair play.”107 Again, it seemed as though the
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 405-406.
348 U.S. 407 (1955).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
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Justices were re-writing the draft law to accord with their understanding of
the Fifth Amendment’s right to procedural due process.
Notably, in Simmons, Justice Clark had dismissed the relevance of a 1945
public-utilities decision that set limits on a party’s Fifth Amendment right to
procedural due process. Yet in Gonzales, he himself cited three such Fifth
Amendment precedents involving public utilities regulation to explain the
“underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play.”108 The most
recent was nearly twenty-years old; the two others predated the New Deal.
These precedents, Justice Clark argued, stood for the proposition that “if the
registrant is to present his case eﬀectively to the [Selective Service] Appeal
Board, he must be cognizant of all the facts before the Board as well as the
over-all position of the Department of Justice.”109
As so often happened in the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court was
resurrecting old constitutional limitations on economic regulation to
constrain national-security regulation that might otherwise threaten an
individual’s civil liberties. This resurrection was odd in that the Gonzales
majority insisted that its decision simply reﬂected the will of Congress, rather
than the Justices’ own views of what the Constitution required.
In dissent, Justices Reed and Burton marveled at Justice Clark’s
acrobatics. Insisting that Gonzales’s classiﬁcation process had violated no
“express or implied” statutory requirements or administrative regulations,
Justices Reed and Burton suggested that the majority’s decision could only
be understood as imposing on the draft apparatus constitutional norms that
had fallen into disrepute decades earlier.110 Justice Sherman Minton—the sole
dissenter in all four March 14th decisions—went further, describing the
Court’s rapid slide from strict deference to invasive supervision of the
Selective Service System as legally inexplicable.111 Minton recognized that
nine years earlier, the Estep Court had broken with tradition in holding that
registrants could challenge their draft classiﬁcations in federal court without
ﬁrst submitting to induction. But the Estep majority had justiﬁed this decision
on the ground that the scope of judicial review would be extremely narrow
and deferential. As Minton emphasized, Estep directed judges to invalidate
Selective Service decisions only if the System had acted beyond its
jurisdiction—that is, if draft administrators had made a decision with no
factual support or in clear violation of the draft law.
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court held that the Justice
Department’s failure to give Gonzales a copy of its advisory opinion about
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
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his conscientious-objector claim rendered his ﬁnal classiﬁcation invalid. This
was so even though no law or regulation “require[d] the Department of Justice
to send [the registrant] a copy of its advisory report,” and even though the
Department’s advisory opinion had no binding eﬀect on the Select Service
System’s eventual classiﬁcation of Gonzales.112 Given these facts, it was hard
to see how the Selective Service appeal board had “los[t] its jurisdiction or
act[ed] beyond it” in denying Gonzales a conscientious-objector
classiﬁcation.113 Nor was the Supreme Court’s imposition of its own views of
optimal administrative procedure a minor inconvenience. Gonzales forced the
Selective Service System to reopen all cases in which a draft appeal board had
denied a conscientious-objector claim without allowing the registrant to read
and respond to the Justice Department’s advisory opinion.114
D. Sicurella v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of
Administrative Statutory Interpretation
The Court’s ﬁnal March 14th decision, Sicurella v. United States,115
exempliﬁed Minton’s legal and ideological disagreement with the majority’s
approach in draft-law cases. Anthony Sicurella was a Jehovah’s Witness who
claimed entitlement to a CO classiﬁcation even though he was willing to ﬁght
to defend “Kingdom Interests, our preaching work, our meetings, our fellow
brethren and sisters and our property against attack.”116 Because of Sicurella’s
belief in the righteousness of certain forms of combat, the Justice Department
concluded that Sicurella had “failed to establish that he is opposed to war in
any form,” the statutory requirement for CO classiﬁcation.117 Accordingly,
Sicurella was not “entitled to exemption within the meaning of the Act.”118
Seven Justices disagreed with the Justice Department’s legal reasoning and
concluded that this legal error invalidated the draft appeal board’s decision.119
The majority reached its conclusion even though there was no evidence
that the draft board had denied Sicurella’s claim based on the Justice
Department’s legal reasoning. And as the Solicitor General argued, even if
Sicurella’s willingness to ﬁght to defend “Kingdom Interests” did not
automatically disqualify him from a CO classiﬁcation, the draft board could
have reasonably interpreted Sicurella’s views on justiﬁed violence as casting
Id. at 417 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Id. at 418 (Minton, J., dissenting).
See Letter from Col. Ingold to Willoughby, AFSC (Apr. 1, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central
Files 1948-1963, Box 96 (announcing the decision to reopen all such cases).
115 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
116 Id. at 387.
117 Id. at 388.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 392.
112
113
114
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doubt on the sincerity of his claim to object to “war in any form.”120 But the
Sicurella majority rejected this argument too, concluding as a matter of law
that willingness to ﬁght in what it described as “theocratic war” provided no
basis for denying a CO classiﬁcation.121 In doing so, the majority chose to
interpret Sicurella’s testimony as evincing only a commitment to engage in
“spiritual” combat. This interpretation contradicted Sicurella’s own
testimony that he would ﬁght to defend the perfectly material property
interests of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Dissenting, Justice Minton bridled at the high-handedness of the
majority’s pronouncements. He accused his fellow Justices of arrogating to
themselves the lawful authority possessed by draft administrators to
determine the most eﬃcient and fair management of military manpower: “It
is not our province to substitute our judgment of the facts for that of the
Board or to correct the Board’s errors of law unless they are so wanton,
arbitrary and capricious as to destroy the jurisdiction of the Board.”122 Minton
again emphasized that while the Estep Court had exposed Selective Service
decisions to limited judicial review, it had also insisted that judges should
only overturn decisions that were truly beyond the jurisdiction of the
Selective Service System—decisions with no basis in fact or statutory
support.123 So long as draft administrators stayed within these minimal
jurisdictional bounds, Estep had called on judges to uphold Selective Service
decisions, “even though they may be erroneous.”124 In Sicurella, however,
seven Justices invalidated a classiﬁcation decision precisely because they
believed it to be “erroneous,” not because they found “that the Board acted
capriciously and arbitrarily or that the judgment of the Board was not an
allowable judgment of reasonable men.”125 The Sicurella majority simply
believed that its legal and factual conclusions were superior to those of the
draft board. The majority’s conclusions might well be sound, Minton allowed,
but courts lacked the authority and the competence to impose their notion of
sound draft policy on the Selective Service System.
Minton’s March 14 dissents focused on the negative impact that the
majority’s reasoning would have on the legal and practical integrity of
conscription. But they also bore traces of a more general anxiety about the
fate of the administrative state that Minton had worked to build as an Indiana
public-utilities administrator and a ﬁercely pro-New-Deal Senator during the
1930s. Back then, Minton had parried constitutional attacks on New Deal
120
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administration by arguing that the Constitution was “the people’s creation,
designed and intended to bring the greatest good to the greatest number.”126
When people were suﬀering, it was thus an oxymoron to say that the
Constitution barred the government from coming to their aid. “You can’t
frighten people by talking to them about their loss of liberty as if liberty was
something apart from human happiness,” Minton argued during his 1934
Senate campaign. “You can’t frighten people today about the loss of their
constitutional rights when they are struggling to live.”127
By the mid-1950s, however, Minton’s view of the Constitution as a popular
charter that not only authorized but required political institutions to advance
the interests of all those Americans “struggling to live” had fallen out of favor.
His 1955 draft-law dissents took aim at the increasingly dominant alternative
view, one that treated the Constitution as a judicially enforced charter of
substantive rights and procedural rules that protected individuals from undue
government coercion. While most judges serving in the federal courts in the
mid-1950s were, like Minton, Democratic appointees, they had gradually
abandoned their New Deal trust in an autonomous administrative state—
especially when it came to administrative decisions that risked encroaching
on civil liberties.128
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY: THE SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE DEFERMENT LOBBY

This change in the judicial mood only became more apparent in the weeks
following the Supreme Court’s March 14, 1955 draft-law decisions. On March
21, Selective Service headquarters began to receive news of draft-law violators
who could no longer be “successfully prosecuted” because of newly recognized
procedural “defects.”129 Two days later, draft administrators reported a slew
of judicial decisions holding that a registrant’s suspiciously recent conversion
to paciﬁsm was not a proper basis for denying his conscientious-objector
claim.130 Then, on March 28, the Supreme Court itself reentered the fray. Its
unsigned opinion in Bates v. United States reversed the National Appeal
126 LINDA C. GUGIN & JAMES E. ST. CLAIR, SHERMAN MINTON: NEW DEAL SENATOR,
COLD WAR JUSTICE 77 (1997).
127 Id.
128 The partial exception was civil liberties cases involving dissenters sympathetic to
communism. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 583 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating a willingness to defer to administrative punishment of army reservists where there
was evidence of their past communist sympathies).
129 Wertz, Memorandum for the File (Mar. 21, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central Files 1948–
1963, Box 96.
130 Letter from Wertz & Wixcey to Col. Franck, 2-3 (Mar. 23, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central
Files 1948–1963, Box 96.
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Board’s denial of a conscientious-objector claim despite ample evidence of
insincerity in the registrant’s ﬁle.131
Without acknowledging the novelty of its reasoning, the Bates Court
explained that the National Appeal Board had committed a procedural error
when it denied Bates’s claim without ﬁrst forwarding his ﬁle to the Justice
Department for an advisory opinion. As evidence of the need for this
procedure, the Court simply cited the draft-law provision that entitled a
registrant to a Justice Department hearing if his local draft board denied his
initial conscientious-objector claim.132 That provision, however, was not
applicable to Bates’s case. Bates’s local board had in fact granted his initial
conscientious-objector claim.133 It was only when Bates refused to comply
with the work requirements for conscientious objectors and requested instead
a ministerial exemption on dubious factual grounds, that the Presidential
Appeal Board concluded that Bates’s initial conscientious-objector
classiﬁcation was unwarranted.134 The lower courts had found this conclusion
to be reasonable given Bates’s evasive actions.135
The Bates decision implied that any time the Selective Service System
intended to deny or rescind a conscientious-objector classiﬁcation—whether
at the local draft-board stage or after several requests for alternative
classiﬁcation—the matter had to be referred to the Justice Department before
a ﬁnal administrative decision could be made. Not only would this new
requirement slow down the draft classiﬁcation process, but it was also an utter
invention of the Supreme Court, nowhere to be found in the draft law and
imposed without explanation. Indeed, it was unclear what the Justice
Department was supposed to do after receiving such a case from the National
Appeal Board.
The statutory provision cited by the Supreme Court instructed the
Department to send its advisory opinion to the registrant’s state appeal board.
But in Bates, the state appeal board had already ruled on the case—denying
Bates’s ministerial request and aﬃrming his CO request. Was the Justice
Department instead expected to send its advisory opinion back to the
National Appeal Board? Presumably. But the Supreme Court did not say so.
Nor did it say that such a procedure was required by the Constitution. It
simply cited a provision of the draft law that did not apply to the case at hand.
At Selective Service headquarters, the Bates decision was met with a
beleaguered shrug. As two lawyers in the General Counsel’s Oﬃce reported:
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“Today the Supreme Court . . . [has] seemed to add one more right to
conscientious objectors by holding that [the draft law] requires that where a
conscientious objector claim has been denied by the National Appeal Board
without [the registrant’s] selective service ﬁle having been referred to the
Department of Justice for inquiry, hearing and recommendation, the
registrant has been denied procedural due process.”136 The Court had not
explicitly used the language of “procedural due process,” or referred to any
other constitutional norm. But, by this time, Selective Service lawyers felt
that nothing else could explain the Court’s increasingly outlandish
interpretations of the draft law. The Court was not only going out of its way
to ﬁnd procedural errors in the classiﬁcation process, but it was also writing
new procedural requirements into the draft law. Accordingly, the General
Counsel’s Oﬃce placed its report on Bates in an ever-growing ﬁle of “Judicial
Decisions Suggesting Legislative Correction.”137
According to a group of federal judges, such “legislative correction” would
be essential if the Selective Service System wanted to slow the courts’
encroachment on the draft apparatus. In mid-April, Daniel Omer, the
General Counsel of Selective Service, had asked twelve judges with some of
the largest draft-law caseloads in the country to give him a sense of how far
lower courts might extend the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. The short
answer was “very far.”138 For example, eleven of the twelve judges felt that
even though the Simmons decision did not require the Justice Department to
hand over full FBI reports to every would-be conscientious objector, that is
what should be done going forward.139 These judges believed that
withholding the reports was “fundamentally wrong.”140 Several judges also
suggested that a “Government Appeal Agent” be present at every local draftboard meeting to ensure that all of a registrant’s rights were protected.141
Most signiﬁcantly, a majority of the judges told Omer that if Congress did
not take aﬃrmative steps to reject the Supreme Court’s recent interpretations
of the draft law, the Selective Service System should “expect all Federal courts
to tend toward leniency in the [law’s] enforcement.” 142
Six weeks before the March 14 Supreme Court decisions, Selective
Service Director Hershey and General Counsel Omer had in fact prepared a
136 Letter from Wixcey & Wertz to Col. Fran (Mar. 28, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central Files
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memorandum of proposed amendments to the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, which was coming up for renewal in June 1955.143 Perhaps
the two most radical amendments sought to restore an earlier era of judicial
deference to Selective Service decisionmaking. The ﬁrst would reverse the
trend of increasing judicial scrutiny of the merits of individual draft
classiﬁcations: “The decisions of selective service boards should be made ﬁnal
and not subject to judicial review except as to procedural errors involving a
denial of due process.”144 The second would limit the judicial venues in which
registrants could challenge their classiﬁcations: “The law should conform to
early decisions of the Supreme Court under which selective service
classiﬁcations are reviewed only in habeas corpus proceedings in which the
Government may appeal from an adverse decision.”145
The next group of amendments aimed to empower draft administrators
to police the many claims that could qualify someone as a conscientious
objector or minister. These amendments responded to recent successes scored
by Jehovah’s Witnesses and other unorthodox draft resisters in the courts.
First, Omer and Hershey recommended that “[i]n considering claims of
conscientious objection, the law should speciﬁcally permit selective service
boards, in determining registrant’s sincerity, to consider his belief in
theocratic warfare, his willingness to kill in self-defense, his humility, and the
time when he was converted.”146 These sorts of beliefs were traditional red
ﬂags of an insincere or fair-weather paciﬁst. Second, in an eﬀort to prevent
young men from entering and leaving the ministry when convenient, “[t]he
classiﬁcation of a minister and of a ministerial student should constitute a
deferment rather than an exemption so as to extend liability.”147 Third, “[t]he
deﬁnition of a minister should exclude ministerial eﬀort in the publication
and sale of religious literature,” the sorts of activities in which nearly all
practicing Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged.148
Hershey and Omer also wanted to make draft resistance a riskier
proposition. First, they proposed that convicted draft law violators serve a
term of imprisonment “at least equal to the time the violator[s] would have
spent in military service if [they] had complied with the law.”149 This
amendment responded to frequent reports of light sentences—sometimes
just probation—handed down by judges in draft-law cases. Second, in
143 Letter from Col. Omer to Gen. Renfrow at 1-2 (Jan. 31, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central
Files 1948–1963, Box 35.
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response to the tendency of conscientious objectors to buck their alternativeservice obligations, Omer and Hershey proposed that “[a]ll penalties which
apply to the evasion of military service should be made to apply to evasion of
work in lieu of induction; as for example: loss of citizenship for leaving the
country to avoid service.”150
Finally, turning from the courts to problems within the executive branch,
Hershey and Omer recommended that “[t]he Director of Selective Service
should be given primary responsibility for the enforcement of the law.”151 This
proposal was a desperate response to growing mistrust between the Selective
Service System and the Justice Department. The Department’s reluctance to
prosecute draft-law violators, its willingness to question draft boards’
conclusions, and its resistance to Selective Service inﬂuence on litigation
strategy were all on the rise.
Hershey and Omer ﬁrst circulated their list of statutory ﬁxes on January
31, 1955. The next day, however, they received a copy of the Second Hoover
Commission’s proposed Administrative Code. At once, their focus shifted
from rolling back the courts to keeping Congress at bay. Six weeks later, they
were forced to change directions again to triage the impact of the Supreme
Court’s mid-March decisions on lower courts, local draft boards, and the
Justice Department. In May 1955, even as the threat from the Second Hoover
Commission subsided, the Selective Service System was bleeding badly from
court-inﬂicted wounds. The number of draft-law amendments that Congress
would need to pass to repair the damage had ballooned since the end of
January. Worse still, the legislative will necessary to pass such a raft of
amendments was missing.
While Congress had balked at the Second Hoover Commission’s radical
proposals for more judicial control of the administrative state, the autonomy
of draft administrators was anything but a legislative priority. To the contrary,
congressional hearings on the extension of the draft law in June 1955 focused
on Director Hershey’s continuing refusal to establish regulations deferring
students and scientists en masse. Such regulations would deprive local draftboard administrators of all discretion in determining whether a given
registrant’s professional expertise or course of study truly merited a
deferment in the interests of national security. Frustrated with Hershey’s
intransigence on this score, lobbyists from the education, pharmaceutical, and
defense industries, along with their supporters in Congress, pushed for a
“special national committee” of twelve outside experts who would have the
authority to veto Selective Service deferment policies.152
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To help fend oﬀ such a sharp political blow to their agency’s autonomy,
Hershey and Omer had included in the January memorandum two proposals
designed to conciliate the “deferment lobby.” These proposed amendments
extended the “II-S” student deferment to both high school and college
students and expanded the number of years during which men would be
eligible for such a deferment.153 Neither of these amendments advanced
Hershey and Omer’s primary goal: preventing lawyers and judges from
dictating Selective Service policy in the name of civil liberty. In fact, the
deferment amendments would shift draft policy in a more “civil libertarian”
direction, entitling draft-aged men to deferments throughout their high
school and college careers, with a corresponding decrease in the pool of young
Americans subject to compulsory military service. But at least the Selective
Service System itself—rather than outside experts—would retain the
authority to administer these changes. Hershey “considered it essential to
preserve the draft system,” even if it meant consigning his agency to a
“purgatory of special registrants.”154 The reward for enduring such purgatory
might even be political support for some of Hershey and Omer’s more highpriority proposals, which aimed to roll back judicial supervision of the draft.
No such reward, however, was forthcoming. In the end, the studentdeferment amendments were the only aspect of Hershey and Omer’s
memorandum that Congress actually adopted. These amendments appealed
to inﬂuential constituencies: corporations, universities, middle-class families,
and military intellectuals who believed the Cold War would be won by
“brainpower” rather than manpower. But they were a devil’s bargain, marking
a major departure from the traditional goal of the Selective Service System:
the relatively egalitarian induction of civilians into the armed forces.
Selective Service had emerged in World War I as a tool for both mobilizing
and uniting the population in an era of class and cultural conﬂict, and the
World War II draft had largely honored this earlier experiment. By the early
1950s, however, many politicians, military modernizers, and private-sector
lobbyists were ready to recast conscription as a tool for diﬀerentiating citizens
in the interests of economic and scientiﬁc growth. A repurposed Selective
Service System would channel less “talented” young men toward the
frontlines when necessary, while encouraging the more “talented” to enter the
ranks of a burgeoning white-collar, highly skilled middle class.155
Director Hershey had resisted this vision of a “meritocratic” draft much
longer than most. In 1953, when a “campaign of professional organizations”
153 Letter from Wertz & Wixcey to Col. Frank (Mar. 23, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central Files
1948-1963, Box 96.
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demanded “veto power over classiﬁcation procedures” to shield the nation’s
better-educated youth from military service, Hershey warned that “[y]ou
can’t teach democracy and practice oligarchy of any intellectual sort.”156 He
pleaded with the American Association for the Advancement of Science “to
avoid promoting the idea that any civilian activity should provide an
exemption from military service.”157 And he bitterly joked that it was
becoming “almost an act of treason to even think of taking” an engineering
student out of school, “whether he makes grades or not.”158 But in 1955, the
tide turned for good.
The student-deferment amendments that Selective Service oﬃcials
proposed as something of a sweetener in January 1955 had become the main
course by June. That month, “[t]o the surprise of many,” Hershey opened his
congressional testimony on the draft renewal bill by lauding “the value of the
deferment system.”159 He not only championed the student deferment
amendments but “began speaking in a positive vein of how the Selective
Service had a new major task—that of channeling young men into nationally
needed careers.”160 Behind closed doors, Hershey admitted that he still “had
many reservations” about using the draft apparatus to beneﬁt young wouldbe professionals and their private-sector employers; this kind of government
beneﬁt was “highly ﬂavored with escapism,” and risked eroding the integrity
and legitimacy of conscription.161 But at least in public, Hershey now
celebrated the very aspect of Selective Service—channeling men away from the
military—that two years earlier he had bemoaned as “a very foul thing.”162
Given the precarious state of the Selective Service System’s legal,
political, and military reputation, Hershey could no longer aﬀord to disparage
the one aspect of conscription celebrated by both civilian elites and military
strategists: its capacity to steer young, well-qualiﬁed men toward careers in
science, technology, and the study of strategically signiﬁcant languages and
cultures. The agency’s 1957 annual report described the Selective Service
System as “a storekeeper of manpower,” and emphasized that the System’s
function was “not only to procure manpower for the armed forces, but also to
defer them to train for and perform important tasks in civilian life.”163 The
1958 annual report went a step further, openly embracing the language of
“channeling” to describe the agency’s use of deferments to shape the civilian
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

FLYNN, supra note 152, at 202.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 204.
JAMES M. GERHARDT, THE DRAFT AND PUBLIC POLICY 235 (1971).

1778

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1749

economy.164 In September of that year, Director Hershey argued that the draft
should be renewed because the Selective Service System was “the only agency
now in existence having and exercising authority which induces individuals to
train for, enter upon and remain in activities essential to the national economy.”165
Congress generally approved of the agency’s new focus on boosting
entrance of qualiﬁed young men into particular civilian professions, rather
than the military. One exception was Senator Strom Thurmond, whose main
constituency was poor white Southerners, unlikely to beneﬁt from the
metastasizing network of deferments. In June 1957, he wrote to Selective
Service headquarters to complain about the injustice of this state of aﬀairs.166
How could draft administrators force some young men to ﬁght for a pittance,
Thurmond asked, while encouraging far more to pursue safe, lucrative
careers?167 In reply, Director Hershey ﬁrst suggested that he was simply
applying the law as written. The Universal Military Training and Service Act
directed his agency “to provide . . . for the ‘maximum eﬀort in the ﬁelds of
scientiﬁc research and development, and the fullest possible utilization of the
Nation’s technological, scientiﬁc and other critical manpower resources.’”168
This language, however, had been on the books since 1948.169 Only
recently had Hershey reconciled himself to implementing the law in such as
a way as to channel as many men as possible away from boot camp and toward
university labs and corporate oﬃces. Traces of this earlier reluctance laced
Hershey’s eﬀort to justify “channeling” to Senator Thurmond. “It is not
inconsistent with fairness and justice,” the Director somewhat haltingly
argued, “that, in the interest of technological and scientiﬁc progress and the
maintenance of the national economy, some men may temporarily be deferred
from performing their obligation to the Nation in the armed forces.”170 The
noble principle of “[u]niversality of service,” it turned out, was open to several
interpretations; “practically” speaking, the principle could certainly not mean
that “ten out of ten [men] will serve on active duty.”171
Hershey’s letter to Senator Thurmond was one of the “ever more tortured
formulations” that government oﬃcials used to justify a coercive apparatus
whose legitimacy depended on two conﬂicting demands: that everyone be
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equally coerced and that no one be coerced at all.172 The language of “fairness,”
often invoked in debates about the draft and the administrative state more
generally, tended to paper over this tension between the egalitarian and the
libertarian critiques of bureaucracy. Hershey could not take a more egalitarian
position on educational and professional deferments because his agency had
been battered by libertarian criticisms for so long. Letting students oﬀ the
hook was one way to alleviate concerns about the threat the draft posed to
individual liberty.
As early as the Korean War, polling had suggested that the provision of
student deferments would be critical to regulating a restive population.
Between 1952 and 1953, eighty-three percent of male college students
reported a “negative attitude toward [military] service,” and sixty-two percent
of college students either “had reservations” about or “were strongly opposed
to the war.” 173 In this ideological climate, the strictly military case for student
deferments—that they ensured a supply of scientiﬁc Cold Warriors—was
overdetermined by political dissatisfaction with the draft. “By satisfying the
demands for preferential treatment of various groups,” one political scientist
notes, “the Selective Service System was able to insulate itself from organized
and politically eﬀective protest.”174
Such “insulation,” however, was more of a rearguard action than a
preemptive strike. The leaner budgets and private-sector protectionism that
came to characterize Selective Service by the late 1950s did mollify some
powerful socio-economic factions. Yet, as in other administrative contexts,
cost cutting and cooperation with the private sector would never satisfy the
strong critics of public manpower management. They believed that only the
submission of the draft apparatus to court-like procedures and extensive
judicial oversight could preserve individual liberty in a bureaucratic age.
These arguments had shrunk the coercive power of the Selective Service
System by mid-1957, smoothing the way for draft administrators’ acceptance
of a new, more passive role as guardians of the elite, well-educated Cold Warrior.
Historians of the draft have generally attributed Selective Service
Director Hershey’s about-face to “political reality.”175 As George Flynn
writes, Hershey was “a realist” who “trimm[ed] his sails” to “accommodate[]
the drive for deferments.”176 Yet the “drive for deferments” was not
signiﬁcantly stronger in the late spring of 1955, when Hershey identiﬁed
channeling and volunteering as the two main functions of the Selective
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Service System, than it had been six months earlier. At that time, Hershey
and his General Counsel, Daniel Omer, had proposed a set of amendments
relatively light on deferments and long on streamlined induction procedures
and stiﬀ penalties for draft resistance. What had changed between January
and June was not simply the “political reality” but also the legal landscape—
speciﬁcally, the March 1955 Supreme Court decisions.
The disposition of these Selective Service cases, the Justice Department’s
lackluster performance in arguing them, and the lower courts’ zeal in
implementing them all indicated that legal elites had lost faith in the Selective
Service System’s traditional functions: the eﬃcient and egalitarian induction
of civilians into the armed forces; and the adjudication of individual requests
for deferment or exemption. Sustained legal resistance to the draft did not
simply represent one threat among many to Hershey’s vision of Selective
Service. It also transformed the threat posed by the “deferment lobby” into
an opportunity. If the courts were going to keep increasing the costs—in
terms of time, resources, and legitimacy—of inducting draft registrants and
adjudicating their classiﬁcation requests, then it might be better, after all, for
Selective Service to downsize its induction and adjudication business. The
deferment lobby’s call for the Selective Service System to focus on
channeling rather than conscription oﬀered the agency a new purpose that
could both minimize conﬂict with the courts and cultivate powerful
constituencies elsewhere in the government and civil society.
CONCLUSION
If streamlined administrative adjudication of claims to deferment or
exemption from compulsory public service oﬀended the civil libertarian
conscience of the 1950s, this was in large part because the civil-libertarian
conscience of the 1950s was inextricably bound up with the cause of
administrative-law reform. In the eyes of an increasingly bipartisan coalition
of reformers, manpower administration on the Selective Service model lacked
the procedural protections that supposedly distinguished Anglo-Saxon
fairness from communistic fiat. Unelected bureaucrats committed first and
foremost to the success of a particular regulatory agenda could not be trusted
to preserve the rule of law, let alone the civil liberty of any particular individual.
So federal courts in the mid-1950s radically curtailed the autonomy of the
Selective Service System, interpreting the draft law in such a way as to permit
more, and more searching, judicial review. Judges also used creative statutory
and regulatory interpretation to limit draft administrators’ discretion,
requiring them to follow a complex set of procedures and to establish a robust
evidentiary record if they wanted their decisions about draft registrants’
eligibility for military service to withstand judicial scrutiny.
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This judicial assault on Selective Service autonomy and discretion was a
leading indicator of the federal courts’ more general turn against New Dealstyle administration during the Eisenhower presidency. In an era deﬁned by
anti-communism at home and abroad, judges were inclined to view the
administrative adjudication of individual rights (whether constitutional or
statutory in form) as procedurally ﬂawed, substantively indiﬀerent to
constitutionally protected civil liberties, and overly driven by the interests of
particular agencies and their private sector supporters, rather than the
overarching public interest.177
That the Selective Service System fell victim to this legal transformation
more quickly and deﬁnitively than many other agencies is both
understandable and ironic. Understandable because the peacetime draft
represented a particularly extreme example of the threat that administrative
decisionmaking could pose to personal liberty. Ironic because most Selective
Service leaders in the late 1940s and early 1950s remained unusually
committed to the old progressive conception of the “public interest,” working
to harmonize as best they could the competing demands of military necessity,
equality of sacriﬁce, and cultural pluralism.178 These leaders also ﬁercely
resisted the capture of the draft apparatus by private-sector interests seeking
special treatment for certain groups of draft registrants. It was only the
judiciary’s singling out of the Selective Service System as a particularly bad
actor when it came to procedural fairness and civil liberty that made
capitulation to private-sector interests so attractive to draft administrators.
A similar transformation had occurred at other agencies, such as the
Federal Communications Commission.179 But conscription’s more totalizing
eﬀects on civilian society elicited intense resistance from both the judiciary
and the private sector. The result was a wholesale reconstruction-from-within
of the Selective Service System’s core functions. Draft administrators rebranded themselves as channelers of “brainpower” into private sector
professions rather than coercers of “manpower” into public sector service.
By the end of the 1950s, the primacy of channeling, and the deferment
system that underwrote it, made the Selective Service System relatively
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popular but also, in Director Hershey’s own words, troublingly “soft.”180 If
the deferments ever went away, he warned, if draft calls ever rose again to the
levels necessary to conduct a real shooting war, the System would lose its base
of popular support just as it confronted a new salvo of litigation from draft
registrants unwilling to serve.181 Such litigation would, in turn, renew the
conﬂict between the Selective Service System and federal prosecutors and
judges. By the mid-1950s, these two groups of legal elites had come to view
draft administration as a regrettable departure from the values of civil liberty
and the rule of law that distinguished the United States from its communist
adversaries. A decade later, their verdict would be even harsher.
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